Unions, Two-Tier Bargaining and Physical Capital Investment: Theory and Firm-Level Evidence from Italy
| Title | Unions, Two-Tier Bargaining and Physical Capital Investment: Theory and Firm-Level Evidence from Italy |
| Publication Type | Working Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2018 |
| Authors | Cardullo, G, Conti, M, Sulis, G |
| Number | 2018_12 |
| ISBN Number | 978 88 9386 086 4 |
| Keywords | Control Function, hold-up, investment, Two-Tier Bargaining, unions |
| Abstract | In this paper we present a search and matching model in which firms invest in sunk capital equipment. By comparing two wage setting scenarios, we show that a two-tier bargaining scheme, where a fraction of the salary is negotiated at firm level, raises the amount of investment per worker in the economy compared to a one-tier bargaining scheme, in which earnings are entirely negotiated at sectoral level. The model’s main result is consistent with the positive correlation between investment per worker and the presence of a two-tier bargaining agreement that we find in a representative sample of Italian firms. |
| Citation Key | 7200 |
| Attachment | Size |
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| 974.21 KB |
