Political Selection and Monetary Incentives in Local Parliamentary Systems
|Title||Political Selection and Monetary Incentives in Local Parliamentary Systems|
|Publication Type||Working Paper|
|Year of Publication||2021|
|Authors||Caria, A, Cerina, F, Nieddu, M|
|ISBN Number||978 88 68513 788|
|Keywords||Local Politicians, Monetary Incentives, Parliamentary System, Political Selection|
Using a rich database on local politicians in Italian municipalities between 1985 and 1992, we implement a regression-discontinuity analysis to evaluate the causal effect of monetary incentives on the characteristics of politicians in local parliamentary systems. We find that higher expected wages result in more educated members of the local council (+0.9 years of schooling), but not in more educated mayors. While low-wage councils tend to elect mayors who have more than two years of schooling than the average councillor, this difference almost vanishes in high-wage councils, up to the point that council-elected mayors end up being less educated in high-wage than in low-wage councils (-0.9 years). Our results highlight that the positive impacts of monetary incentives can be undone or even reversed in the parliamentary stage of the election process. More generally, they suggest that the effects of monetary incentives are not invariant across different institutional settings.