How do Financial Intermediaries Create Value in Security Issues?

TitleHow do Financial Intermediaries Create Value in Security Issues?
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2014
AuthorsAdriani, F, Deidda, LG, Sonderegger, S
JournalReview of Finance
Volume18
Issue5
Pagination1915-1951
Abstract

We study incentive provision in a model of securities issuance with an informed issuer and uninformed investors. We show that the presence of an informed intermediary may increase surplus even if we allow for collusion between the intermediary and the issuer. Collusion is neutralized by introducing a misalignment between the interests of the issuer and those of the intermediary. To achieve this, the intermediary commits to hold some of the securities. The intermediary then underprices the remaining securities and extracts any investor surplus through a “participation fee.” We provide an explanation for the diffusion of book building and quid pro quo practices in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs).

URLhttp://rof.oxfordjournals.org/content/18/5/1915.abstract?sid=f76596d7-ea75-4789-a691-f9f0b9367427
DOI10.1093/rof/rft027