Seminar CRENoS-DECA 2009: White Knights and the Corporate Governance of Hostile Takeovers

18/05/2009 - 14:00 to 16:00

Aula Magna, Faculty of Economics

Via Sant'Ignazio 74, Cagliari

Presentation of the paper
White Knights and the Corporate Governance of Hostile Takeovers

Sonia Falconieri
Brunel University London


On Monday 18 May at 12:00
Aula Magna - Faculty of Economics


We analyze the dynamics of takeover contests where hostile raiders compete against white knights involved by a lead blockholder of the target firm (the incumbent). We assume that the incumbent has the power to bargain with the potential bidders to set a minimum takeover price. We characterize the conditions under which a white knight wins the takeover contest despite the smaller value of its synergies as compared to those of the hostile bidder. The paper provides a new explanation for the reason why we observe so few hostile takeovers in reality; moreover, it sheds some light on the effectiveness of white knights as an anti-takeover device and the role played by leading minority blockholders in the market for corporate control.

For more information:
Tel. +39 070 6756414    Fax +39 070 6756402


For the remaining seminars see the poster attached