Presentation of the paper
 
Language, meaning and games

Speaker
Stefano Demichelis
University of Pavia
 
On Monday 11 May at 12:00
Aula Magna - Faculty of Economics

Abstract
Language is a powerful coordination device. We generalize the cheap-talk
approach to pre-play communication by way of introducing a meaning correspondence
between messages and actions, and by postulating two axioms
met by natural languages. Players have a lexicographic preference, second to
material payoffs, against deviating from the meaning correspondence. Under
two-sided communication in generic and symmetric n x n-coordination games,
a Nash equilibrium component in such a lexicographic communication game is
evolutionarily stable if and only if it results in the unique Pareto efficient outcome
of the underlying game. We extend the analysis to one-sided communication
in arbitrary finite two-player games.
 

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